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Abstract
What is the optimal way to stabilize shocks and to take care of ﬁscal discipline
in a ﬁscal union ? Among the various possible ways, this paper focuses on an inter-
countries insurance scheme conditioned by the national preference for the ﬁscal dis-
cipline of each government. We will show that the insurance scheme improves signif-
icantly the union’s social welfare because it enables to cover deviations of the ouptut
gap and correct national preferences.
Keywords : inter-countries insurance, stabilization, ﬁscal discipline, EU, ﬁscal
federalism, selection adverse.
JEL Classiﬁcation : E 61, E 62, H 62, H 77.
Introduction
The question of introducing an insurance scheme between the member countries of the
EMU is particularly acute. Indeed, since the European governments have faced diﬃculties
in stabilizing their economic situation because of the ﬁscal rules which press on their
decisions, we have to wonder about the interest of an alternate mechanism which would
substitute for the ongoing mechanism.
In the EMU, national ﬁscal policies are governed by the Stability Pact, intended to
secure ﬁscal discipline within the union, and by the subsidiarity principle, which leaves
a large room for initiative in ﬁscal policies. Nevertheless, the Stability Pact, prohibiting
« excessive » public deﬁcits, seems mainly to have been motivated by the fear of unbearable
national debt rather than by the need for ﬂexibility1. The main risk is then that it may be
an obstacle to the use of national budgets as a stabilizing tool during recessions, making
ﬁscal policies pro-cyclical2.
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1although Villieu (2003) interprets the Stability Pact as an implicit coordination tool of the national
ﬁscal policies which allows to improve the stabilization of important asymmetrical shocks in the union.
2See, notably, Eichengreen & Wyplosz (1998) or still Kadareja (2001).
1Faced with such a situation, several alternatives are oﬀered. Two main lines of research
emerge from these works. A ﬁrst way of research consists in relaxing the current ﬁscal rule
which presses on EU member countries so as to let play the subsidiarity principle fully3.A
second way of research proposes to set up a centralized stabilization scheme which would
come to complement national ﬁscal policies or to substitute for them4.W eh a v ec h o o s e n
to explore this second way of research.
The literature on the relevance of a centralized stabilization scheme in the EU has had
a new development with the birth of the EMU since the end of the nineties5. Nevertheless,
the idea of establishing a speciﬁc stabilization mechanism in the EMU intended to smooth
asymmetric shocks is fairly old6. More recently, some works have tried to study the interest
of a centralized stabilization scheme as regards the double requirement of stabilization and
of ﬁscal discipline within a monetary union7.
Our approach will take place within the framework of these recent works. We will con-
sider the introduction of a transfers centralized scheme which would come as a substitute
for the Stability Pact. The envisaged mechanism will later be considered as a hybrid in-
surance mechanism as far as it has to fulﬁl a double mission which distinguishes it from a
standard insurance mechanism : it must not only insure countries against random shocks
but also take care of ﬁscal discipline within a union in which member countries diﬀer by
their relative preferences for deﬁcit stabilization. Thus, the aim of this article is to deter-
mine the shape and properties of the optimal insurance contract for every governmental
type and to estimate the implications of it on the stabilization of ouput gap, deﬁcit and
on the social loss of the union.
Like Hougaard Jensen & van Aarle (1996), we will study various possible conﬁgura-
tions for the ﬁscal policy in the EU and we will attempt to shed light on the relevance of a
centralized transfer mechanism in terms of stabilization and ﬁscal discipline. Nevertheless,
our analysis diﬀers from theirs for several reasons. First of all, we model explicitly the
interplay between the various levels of ﬁscal power. Besides, we make endogeneous the de-
termination of the transfers mechanism which results henceforth from the central agency’s
game. Finally, we raise the hypothesis that countries have the same structural parameters,
assuming that ﬁscal governments diﬀer by their preference for ﬁscal discipline. From then
on, the insurance contract can be conditioned on national speciﬁcities.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 1 sets out the model. In section
2, we will study the national reaction functions. In section 3, we will characterize the
equilibrium with symmetric information. In section 4, we will characterize the selection
adverse equilibrium.
3See, for example, Barbier & Villieu (2003) or else Barbier-Gauchard & Blot (2003).
4As it’s generally the case in a big number of ﬁscal unions such as the United States, Canada or also
Switzerland.
5See Beine & Docquier (1997) or still Huart & van Aarle (1999).
6See notably the report of Mac Dougall (1977), van der Ploeg (1991), Majocchi & Rey (1993), or still
Hammond & von Hagen (1995).
7See Hougaard Jensen & van Aarle (1996) or still van Aarle (2001).
21 The model
We consider a union of N identical countries. Each country i is characterized by the
following reduced form according to which the output gap depends on public deﬁcit (where
a represents the output gap sensibility to deﬁcit with 0 <α<1), on a positive random












B − βi in the good state of nature (2)
where the M exponent refers to « bad state of nature » and the B exponent to « good
state of nature » with yi the level of output gap, di the level of public deﬁcit, x an i.i.d.
random shock (xM in the bad state of nature and xB in the good state of the nature), αi
the net of premium compensation received by country i in case of unfavourable shock and
βi the premium paid by country i in case of favourable shock.
The union consists in two levels of ﬁscal decision : the central stage represented by
a central agency and the national stage represented by the national governments of the
union. There are two types of national governments which diﬀer by their sensitivity for
ﬁscal discipline noted γi : nH type H governments (H stands for « high») characterized
by a strong preference for ﬁscal discipline noted γH and nL type L governments (L stands
for « low ») characterized by a weak preference for ﬁscal discipline noted γL with γH >γ L.
Afterwards, type H will correspond to the « virtuous » type as far as it shows a strict
budget control and the L type to the « laxists » because it presents a more relaxed ﬁscal
discipline. So, in case of a cyclical shock, H type governments will stabilize their deﬁcit
better than L type gouvernments, but not so much their economic situation.
The game between central agency and national governments is a Stackelberg four-stage
game in which the central agency plays as leader and national ﬁscal authorities play in Nash
(that is in a non-cooperative way) as followers. First, the central agency plays by deter-
mining an optimal menu of insurance contracts. Second, the nature plays by determining
the state of nature (favourable or unfavourable shock), observed by all the players. Third,
national ﬁscal authorities play by determining the optimal ﬁscal deﬁcit. Finally, payments
are made between central agency and national governments. To obtain the equilibrium
in this Stackelberg game, we must ﬁrst determine the governments’ reaction functions.
Indeed, as any game with sequential decisions, the resolution takes place backwards. From
then on, we ﬁrst have to determine the reaction functions of national ﬁscal authorities to
be able to introduce them into the central agency’s optimization program.
Every government, playing as follower, is going to minimize its loss with regard to the
public deﬁcit by considering central agency behavior as given. The national loss expresses
toward a quadratic function noted Li depending on the deviations of output gap yi and of





(1 − γi)( yi − y
∗)
2 + γi (di)
2
with 0 <γ i < 1 (3)
3In this context, countries have to arbitrate between stabilizing their economic situation
at the cost of a high deﬁcit or reducing their deﬁcit at the cost of a weaker stabilization.
The resolution of this optimization program gives us the following reaction functions which
expresses the optimal public deﬁcit according to the insurance contract determined by the
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i indicates the reaction function of a type i government in the state of nature j
with i = H or L and j = G or B. Thus, optimal public deﬁcit presents three components :
a cyclical component which depends on the random shock8, a structural component which
depends on the output gap target9 and an insurance component that negatively aﬀects
public deﬁcit in the bad state of nature and positively in the good state of nature10.T h u s ,
the national ﬁscal intervention allows, whatever the state of nature is, to improve output
gap stabilization. Indeed, output gap becomes less sensitive to cyclical shocks because the
sensitivity shifts down from 1 to
γi
a2 (1−γi)+γi. Besides, this sensitivity is all the weaker as γi
is weak. However, whatever the government type considered is, national ﬁscal stabilization
never allows to completely stabilize cyclical shocks. Besides, ﬁscal behavior is diﬀerentiated
because of the heterogeneousness of national preferences for deﬁcit stabilization. It seems
that the « virtuous » stabilize their public deﬁcit better but their output gap less than
the « laxists ». Consequently, the stumbling block of such a system appears. Indeed, it
could be accompanied by an explosion of public deﬁcits in some countries and real lack
of cyclical stabilization in others. That’s why we are interested in the relevance of an
insurance scheme intended to improve the output gap stabilization while taking care of
ﬁscal discipline within the union.
The central agency, acting as as a leader central planner, is going to minimize its
expected loss with regard to the menu of insurance contracts (αH,β H) and (αL,β L) under
the constraint of nul expected proﬁt and of the national reaction functions. The union’s
social loss function noted L is also a quadratic loss function depending on the deviation of





(1 − γ) nH (yH − y∗)2 +( 1− γ) nL (yL − y∗)2 + γn H (dH)2 + γn L (dL)2

(6)
The central agency’s aim is double : oﬀering to member states a coverage against random
shocks and correcting national arbitrages with γL <γ<γ H. The parameter γ represents
the speciﬁc central agency sensitivity for ﬁscal discipline. We suppose that γ>γ L i.e. that
the central agency cares more for ﬁscal discipline than the « laxists » and that γ>γ H
8The cyclical deﬁcit is all the more sensitive to shocks as preference for ﬁscal discipline γi is low.
9Structural deﬁcit is all the more sensitive to the output gap target as preference for ﬁscal discipline γi
is low.
10Public deﬁcit is of all the more sensitive to the insurance contract as it presents a low preference for
ﬁscal discipline γi.
4i.e. that the central agency is less worried by ﬁscal discipline than the « virtuous ». The
constraint of nul expected proﬁt is frequently used in the insurance litterature. In our
framework, it represents a long-term budget-balance constraint which can be written like :
−pn H αH +( 1− p) nH βH − pn L αL +( 1− p) nL βL =0 (7)
where p is the probability to be hit by a random negative shock xM and, consequently,
(1 − p) is the probability to be hit by a random positive shock xB.
2 Insurance and symmetric information
In the symmetric information situation, the central agency knows the number of countries
of every type and knows which type every country belongs to. In other words, the central
agency perfectly knows how to distinguish between the « virtuous » and the « laxists ». As
a consequence, the central agency can determine a contract adapted for every country type
and conditional to the observation of cyclical shocks. Then, there are as many contracts
as there are types. The resolution of this optimization program allows us to determine the
optimal insurance contracts expression :
αH = x
M −
nL (A − B)
nH A + nL B
y
∗ ,β H = x
B +
nL (A − B)





nH (A − B)
nH A + nL B
y
∗ ,β L = x
B −
nH (A − B)






2 (1−γ)+a2 γ (1−γH)2 and B =
[a2 (1−γL)+γL]2
γL
2 (1−γ)+a2 γ (1−γL)2
Consequently, the insurance contract proposed to every type of ﬁscal authority depends
on the scope of the observed cyclical shock and on the output gap target but also on the
proportion of every type of government nH and nL, on the sensitivity for ﬁscal discipline of
national governments γH and γL and of the central agency’s γ. So, the insurance contract
answers the two raised problems in this economy since each term of the contract presents
two components. An insurantial component, enabling to be covered against random shocks,
answers the stabilization problem. It enables to stabilize completly random shocks. This
component is identical for each type of government but diﬀers according to the state of
nature11. A corrective component allows to answer the ﬁscal heterogeneousness problem.
It aﬀects the insurantial component positively or negatively. This component is identical
for each state of nature but diﬀers according to government type12. We can moreover note
that, without the ﬁscal heterogeneity problem that is if γ = γH = γL, full insurance is the
optimal solution.
11cThis insurancial omponent rises in xM in the bad state of nature and in xB in the good state of
nature.
12This corrective component rises in −
nL (A−B)
nH A+nL B y∗ or the « virtuous » governments and in
nH (A−B)
nH A+nL B y∗ for the « laxists ».
5The diﬀerentiation of insurance contracts takes place through the corrective constituent,
intended to correct national arbitrages . This component diﬀers according to the govern-
ment type and its determinants are twofold. First, the proportion of every type of gov-
ernment plays a crucial role. If the virtuous governments are more numerous than the lax
governments then the virtuous corrective component is weaker than that of the laxists.
Second, the sign of (A − B) plays also a crucial role. If it is positive then the virtuous
governments undergo a ﬁne which comes to reduce net compensation and to increase paid
premium (compared to the full insurance) whereas the laxists beneﬁt from an additional
payment which comes, on the contrary, to increase net compensation and to reduce paid
premium. The sign of (A − B) depends on the value of the social preference for deﬁcit
stabillization γ. More precisely, it depends on the distance between the social preference
for deﬁcit stabilization and national preferences i.e. γH − γ et γ − γL
13.
Finally, at the symmetric information equilibrium, the insurance scheme enables to
stabilize completly random shocks but the existence of a heterogeneousness of national
preferences for ﬁscal discipline introduces a corrective component in every insurance con-
tract. For every government type, the eﬀect of this component depends on the distance
between the central preference and national preferences for deﬁcit stabilization. So, if so-
cial preferences are relatively close to the virtuous preferences (the case if A>B ) then the
virtuous support a ﬁne whereas the laxists get an additional payment. Whatever happens,
the insurance sheme reduces the social expected loss.
3 Insurance and selection adverse
However, it is unlikely that the central agency perfectly knows national preferences or
can use this information to discriminate between governments (for political reasons for
example). So, it seems relevant to tackle the situation in which the type of ﬁscal authorities
constitutes a hidden characteristic for the central agency. We are then in a frame of
selection adverse. By continuing to propose the contracts obtained above, one of the two
types of government is going to be tempted to choose the insurance contract intended for
the other type. In this context, the central agency has to introduce incentive-compatibility
constraints in its optimization program. These constraints allow to verify that every type
of government gets a lower expected loss with their contrat than with the contract intended
for the other type and can spelt thus with ELi(αk,β k) is the expected loss of a gouvernment
i with the insurance contract intended to the type k :
ELH(αL,β L) ≥ ELH(αH,β H) (10)
ELL(αH,β H) ≥ ELL(αL,β L) (11)
13Let’s remember that [a2 (1 − γL)+γL] < [a2 (1 − γH)+γH] because γL <γ H. We then show that
A−B>0 ⇔ [a2 (1−γH)+γH]( γ−γL)−[a2 (1−γL)+γL]( γH −γ) > 0. So, if the central agency shows
a strong preference for deﬁcit stabilization then virtuous governments undergo a ﬁne whereas the laxists
beneﬁt from an additional payment. In that case, social preferences come near the virtuous preferences
but remote from those of the laxists. Consequently, the central agency has to correct the arbitrages of the
laxists. In other words, the only means for the central agency to correct the laxist preferences, given the
balanced budget constraint, is to introduce a ﬁne on the virtuous.
6The resolution of this optimization program gives the following contract :
αH = αL = α = x
M et βH = βL = β = x
B (12)
Consequently, we are in the presence of a pooling insurance contract, which means
that, in the presence of selection adverse, the central agency can no longer oﬀer dividing
contracts to governments. Compared with the equilibrium without insurance, it also seems
that the introduction of an insurance contract reduces the expected social loss as well as the
expected national losses. In comparison to the equilibrium with insurance and symmetric
information, it appears that the expected social losses are higher. To study the eﬀect on
national expected losses, it is necessary to distinguish two cases according to the nature
of the incentive problem. If A>Bthat is if the virtuous are tempted to cheat then the
selection adverse equilibrium improves their situation. On the contrary, the laxists see
their expected loss increase and conversely if A<B .
Concluding remarks
In a union of countries, national governments have to arbitrate between stabilizing their
economic situation at the cost of a high deﬁcit or reducing their deﬁcit at the cost of a lesser
stabilization. in this context, the questions raised is how to insure a better stabilization
of the activity while taking care of a certain ﬁscal discipline. This paper focuses on the
relevance of an inter-country insurance scheme in a context where the information can
be asymmetric. Even though the modelization remains extremely simplistic, this study
enables to ﬁnd out some signiﬁcant results as to the relevance of such a mechanism within
a union of countries. Furthermore, these results correspond to results highlighted in the
traditional insurance literature.
Whatever the informational situation is, the introduction of an hybrid insurance scheme
permits to reduce the expected social loss. If the central agency can perfectly discriminate
between governments then the stabilization problem is solved by full insurance whereas
the problem of the heterogeneousness of national preferences is solved by a payment/ﬁne
system. This corrective mechanism depends on the number of governments of every type
and on the dimension of the heterogeneousness of national preferences. This corrective
component is all the higher as national preferences are heterogeneous. Generally speaking,
the correction of the national arbitrages of some can be made only by punishing the others
because of the budget balanced constraint of the central agency. On the contrary, if the
central agency cannot perfectly discriminate between governments then only the problem of
stabilization is solved. Again, shocks are totally stabilized by full insurance. Nevertheless,
the problem of the heterogeneousness of national preferences is not solved any more as
far as the central agency can no longer distinguish the virtuous from the laxists. In a
general way, we can’t hope to correct national arbitrages by a hybrid insurance scheme
when information is asymmetrical. So, it would be preferable to consider that the transfer
centralized scheme might come to complement the Stability Pact rather than to substitute
for it.
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